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Abstract
From a deterrence perspective, private enforcement of consumer law can be 
insufficient for several reasons. Individual consumers may find it too costly 
to start a lawsuit (‘rational apathy’) or they may not even know that an 
infringement has occurred (‘information asymmetry’). If public enforcement 
is not available, or if the budget of public authorities is limited and used for 
other purposes, the problem of under-enforcement will persist. Collective 
actions may be able to mitigate these problems. If many consumers can join 
their claims, the costs per claim decrease so that the rational apathy problem 
might be overcome. If consumer associations have standing, they might be 
able to acquire better information regarding infringements than individual 
consumers are able to do. However, collective actions pose problems of their 
own. The leading plaintiff or the organisation issuing the collective action 
could try to advance its own interests, rather than furthering overall 
consumer interests. Moreover, a large-scale lawsuit might harm the 
reputation of the defendant and thus create the possibility of ‘frivolous suits’. 
The paper discusses a number of possibilities to overcome these problems. 
Ultimately, private and public enforcement will need to co-exist, since 
collective actions are not a perfect instrument to achieve optimal deterrence. 
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1 Introduction 
An extensive body of consumer protection laws was enacted in European 
countries in the 1980s and ‘90s.1 Large parts of consumer law have been 
harmonised by European regulations and directives.2 Many commentators 
agree that the existing rules of substantive law provide adequate protection 
to consumers active in the marketplace. Problems are encountered mainly in 
the field of ensuring compliance with consumer protection laws; a general 
criticism is that these laws are insufficiently enforced.3 Even though one may 
disagree with the first view, in particular when consumer protection rules are 
analysed through the lenses of economic analysis of law,4 lack of 
enforcement does indeed currently seem to be the major challenge for 
improving consumer protection in European countries.  
There are many reasons for the insufficient enforcement of consumer 
rights, particularly in cases of harm inflicted upon consumers in general. 
Firstly, private enforcement can fail because individual claims are costly, 
time consuming and risky, due to their uncertain results.5 Moreover, the 
remedies awarded in the case of violation of consumer rights could be 
inadequate.6 Injunctive actions may not be sufficient to deter conduct 
harming consumers7 and damage awards can remain under-compensatory. 
Secondly, until recently public enforcement of consumer protection laws 
1 See S. Weatherill, EC Consumer Law and Policy (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 
2005). 
2 An overview of the ‘consumer acquis’ is given in the annex of Regulation 
2006/2004, OJ L 364, 9.12.2004, at 11. To this list must be added Directive 
2005/29/EC on unfair business-to-consumer practices (OJ L 149, 11.6.2005, at 22-
39).
3  See S. Deutch, ‘Consumer Class Actions: Are They a Solution for Enforcing 
Consumer Rights? The Israeli Model’, 27 Journal of Consumer Policy 179 (2004) 
and the contributions in W. van Boom and M. Loos, Collective Enforcement of 
Consumer Law; Securing Compliance in Europe through Private Group Action and 
Public Authority Intervention  (Groningen: Europa Law Publishing 2007). 
4 For a summary of the most important criticisms, see R.J. Van den Bergh, ‘Wer 
schützt die europäischen Verbraucher vor dem Brüsseler Verbraucherschutz? Zu den 
möglichen adversen Effekten der europäischen Richtlinien zum Schutze des 
Verbrauchers’, in C. Ott und H.-B. Schaefer (eds.) Effiziente Verhaltenssteuerung 
und Kooperation im Zivilrecht (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck 1997) 77-102. 
5  S. Deutch, above n. 3 at 180. 
6 W. D. Slawson ‘Mass Contracts: Lawful Fraud in California’, 48 Southern 
California Law Review (1974) 1 at 6. 
7 H-W. Micklitz and A. Stadler ‘The Development of Collective Legal Actions in 
Europe, especially in German Civil Procedure’, 17 European Business Law Review 
1473 (2006)  at 1475. 
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was not available in a number of European countries.8 Regulation 2006/2004 
has forced EU member states to establish public enforcement authorities for 
ensuring that cross-border infringements of consumer protection laws will be 
adequately sanctioned. But even the combined use of individual law suits 
and public enforcement may still fall short of ensuring an adequate level of 
enforcement of consumer protection laws. Public authorities face budget 
constraints and government priority considerations may divert resources to 
other enforcement activities. Individual claims could remain unattractive 
because the private costs of initiating legal proceedings tend to exceed the 
expected private benefits. In addition, individual victims might prefer to take 
a free ride on the efforts of those consumers who decide to act as plaintiffs. 
The combined effect of rational apathy and free-riding will be a sub-optimal 
level of enforcement.  
 Several possibilities exist to enhance the enforcement of consumer 
protection laws. A first option is the institution of a test case procedure. On 
request of parties or by decision of the court, the common issues of several 
claims can be identified and decided in a single trial. Such procedures are 
available in Germany, Austria and the United Kingdom; they are not 
discussed in this paper.9 A second option is to create the possibility of 
collective action. A particular form of collective action, the ‘American style’ 
class action, has been criticized because it puts a large burden on courts10
and could create scope for frivolous claims. In particular, the attorney acting 
as the class representative may bring an unfounded claim to induce the 
defendant company to accept a settlement out of court. For a bona fide large 
firm, the latter can be more advantageous than paying the costs of a 
prolonged and expensive litigation. Class actions have been criticised also 
for other reasons, which are not inherent in this particular enforcement 
mechanism, but characteristic of US law. Rather than the class action in 
itself, some traits of the American legal system seem to cause major 
problems; they include contingency fees, punitive damages and jury bias. 
Contingency fees might be an appropriate way of financing the costs of a 
collective action but are often seen as contrary to the ethical rules of the 
8 Conversely, public enforcement has been the dominant enforcement mechanism in 
the field of competition law. See R. J. Van den Bergh and P.D. Camesasca, 
European Competition Law and Economics. A Comparative Perspective (London: 
Sweet & Maxwell 2006, 2nd ed.) at 325. 
9 See for more information: J. Stuyck et al., An Analysis and Evaluation of 
Alternative Means of Consumer Redress other than Redress through Ordinary 
Proceedings, Final Report Study for the European Commission (2007)  
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress/reports_studies/index_en.htm.
10 M. Handler ‘The Shift from Substantive to Procedural Innovations in Antitrust 
Suits - The Twenty-Third Annual Antitrust Review’, 71 Columbia Law Review 
(1971) 1 at 7. 
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legal profession.11 Punitive damages are criticised because they lead to 
overcompensation, even though they may be an effective method to cope 
with the risk of under-enforcement due to the low probability of detecting 
infringements. Finally, the US jury system could create a bias, to the 
detriment of large commercial enterprises, and lead to the award of 
enormous compensation sums.  
Even though the above criticisms should be taken seriously, one 
must avoid throwing the baby out with the bathwater. The challenge is to 
design collective actions in such a way that the problems of under-
enforcement of consumer rights are solved, while at the same time the 
potential disadvantages of new enforcement mechanisms are minimized. To 
that end one should look at alternatives to the ‘American style’ class action. 
These can be either collective actions initiated by individual consumers but 
with different (‘European’) characteristics or collective actions initiated by 
representative bodies, such as consumer associations. Hereinafter the latter 
form of collective actions is discussed under the heading ‘representative 
actions’.
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 will provide a 
brief overview of two different models of collective actions: collective 
claims initiated by an individual person or group of persons in the name of a 
group of harmed consumers, and representative actions initiated by 
consumer associations in the collective interests of consumers. A further 
distinction will be made depending on whether and how individual 
consumers decide to adhere to a collective claim (opt-in or opt-out). Sections 
3 and 4 will then tackle the main research question of this paper: How 
should collective actions be designed to maximise their net advantages? To 
answer this question, there should be clarity about the objectives to be 
achieved by collective actions for damages. Discussions on public or private 
enforcement are often obscured by the lack of a clear definition of the goals. 
Both efficiency (deterrence of infringements of consumer protection laws) 
and corrective justice (compensation of harm inflicted upon consumers) 
occupy a prominent place in the debate on the goals of law enforcement. 
From the perspective of economic efficiency, the major goal of damages 
claims is to deter welfare-reducing infringements of consumer protection 
11 It is argued that contingency fees put the independence of the lawyers in jeopardy, 
since they get a personal interest in the case that may diverge from the clients’ 
interests. In the Law and Economics literature, the reply to this traditional criticism 
is that principal-agent problems also exist under hourly fees but manifest themselves 
in a different way (see F.H. Stephen and J.H. Love ‘Regulation of the Legal 
Profession’, in B. Bouckaert and G. De Geest (eds.), Encyclopedia of Law and 
Economics III,  (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 2000) 986 at 1002). With respect to the 
opinions on the impact of contingency fees on the risks of early settlements and 
unmeritorious cases, see below in sections 4.1.-4.3.  
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laws. Therefore, the central question of this paper is whether collective 
actions may contribute to prevent infringements of consumer law. The goal 
of compensation (corrective justice) is discussed only so far as it is 
instrumental to achieve the deterrence goal, by increasing the size of the 
expected costs of law infringements. In section 3 we will explain the benefits 
of collective actions. The main benefits seem to be the possibilities of 
reducing the existing information asymmetry and solving the rational apathy 
problem on the side of individual consumers. In section 4 we will address 
the main criticisms that have been forwarded against a widespread use of 
collective actions. These include: the costs imposed on courts, problems 
connected with the way in which collective actions are financed, the risk of 
frivolous suits and opportunistic behaviour of representative bodies. We will 
show that both the expected size of the potential benefits and the seriousness 
of the potential disadvantages vary according to the model of collective 
action which has been adopted. Finally, section 5 will summarise the main 
results of the paper and suggest a number of questions for further research.  
2 Types of collective action  
Collective actions may be classified in different categories. Depending on 
who the plaintiff is, collective actions can be divided into two types: i) 
proceedings initiated by an individual claimant (or group of claimants) in the 
name of a group of consumers; ii) proceedings initiated by a body 
representing consumer interests, such as consumer associations which have 
received legal standing.12 A subsequent differentiation can be made on the 
basis of the possibilities of consumers to either opt in or opt out. Under the 
first model, individuals, after having been appropriately informed about the 
infringement, must express the wish to participate in the proceedings. Under 
the latter model, individuals must assert their wish not to be bound by the 
outcome of the litigation. In principle, opting in or opting out is possible at 
all stages of the legal proceedings, for example before the trial has started or 
after a settlement has been reached. Individual decisions to opt in or opt out 
are not part of so-called mandatory class actions, which can be found in the 
US. Another distinction can be made, depending on the sanctions that can be 
imposed by courts. Many European countries allow actions for injunctive 
12 Similar distinctions are made by S. Deutch, above n. 3 and K. Viitanen, 
‘Enforcement of Consumers’ Collective Interests by Regulatory Agencies in the 
Nordic countries’ in: W. van Boom and M. Loos (eds.) Collective Consumer 
Interests and How they Are Served Best in Europe: Legal aspects and policy issues 
on the border between private law and public policy (Groningen: Europa Law 
Publishing (forthcoming June 2007)). 
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relief brought by consumer associations in particular fields of law (for 
example, in the area of fair trade practices). Conversely, only very few 
European countries presently have types of collective actions for damages. 
This paper discusses only the latter type of collective actions.  
The best-known example of a private collective action for damages 
is the US class action. In this model, an individual consumer or a number of 
consumers with a common interest can file claims to obtain redress for the 
entire ‘class’ of consumers in one single action. Rule 23 of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure enumerates four prerequisites for class actions: i) the 
number of members of the group must be very large so that joinder of all 
members is impracticable, ii) there are questions of law or fact common to 
all members of the class, iii) the claims of the representative parties are 
typical of the claims of the class, and iv) the representative parties will fairly 
and adequately protect the interests of the members of the class. Next, Rule 
23 delineates three major categories suitable for class treatment. These are: i) 
the risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual 
members of the class or adjudications with respect to individual members 
which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of 
individuals not parties in the legal proceedings, ii) the fact that the defendant 
has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, and 
iii) the finding of the court that the questions of law or fact common to the 
class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members of 
the class and that a class action is the best method for a fair and efficient 
adjudication of the controversy. In American class actions, the main remedy 
is the award of damages which compensate the members of the class for 
their losses. Often, very large damage awards are granted; enormous 
compensations are largely due to the jury system and the possibility of 
granting statutory treble damages and punitive damages.  
In European countries, rules of procedural law do not generally 
allow a single individual or a number of individuals to sue without the prior 
consent of each member of the affected group. Many EU member states 
(including the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands 
and Sweden) have granted standing to private associations or public bodies, 
which can bring representative actions. However, these rights are mostly 
limited to obtain injunctive relief and sometimes disgorgement of unlawfully 
obtained profits (Germany). The vast majority of EU member states 
presently have no collective action for damages at all. However, some 
countries (including the United Kingdom, Sweden, Spain, Portugal and 
Lithuania) have adopted legislation in the field of procedural law to increase 
the effectiveness of private enforcement. This has led to the creation of new 
enforcement mechanisms which are somewhat similar to US-style class 
action, even though the discussion below will make it clear that they do not 
have the characteristics typical of the American legal procedure. A solution 
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closer to the American class action has been adopted in the Netherlands. 
Given its specific characteristics, it will be discussed in somewhat greater 
detail. Moreover, in other countries (Belgium, Finland,13 Denmark and Italy) 
proposals concerning the introduction of a representative collective action 
for damages have been submitted.  
In the United Kingdom, collective actions for damages are available. 
In addition, specified bodies (allowed by the Foreign Secretary) are 
permitted to bring representative follow-on actions for infringement of 
competition law before the Competition Appeal Tribunal.14 In Sweden, 
collective actions for claiming compensation have been possible since the 
enactment of the Group Proceedings Act in 2003. Group actions are possible 
if they fulfil the general requirement that the facts are identical and that it is 
sensible to decide the disputes in a single trial. Collective actions can be 
initiated both by private individuals and organisations protecting citizens’ 
interests or a public authority, such as the Consumer Ombudsman. An opt-in 
scheme has been chosen to form the group; as a consequence, only 
individuals who have adhered will be affected by the judgment.15 After three 
years of experience, 6 out of 7 cases were initiated by private parties.16
According to the Dutch Civil Code, a foundation or association with 
full legal capacity can institute an action intended to protect similar interests 
of other persons to the extent that its articles promote such interests. The 
organisation has no standing if, in the given circumstances, it has not made 
sufficient attempts to achieve the objective of the action through consultation 
with the defendant. The organisations can sue both for an injunction and for 
damages regarding losses of the organisation itself, but not for compensatory 
damages regarding losses of the members of the group. The assessment of 
damages therefore has to be carried out in individual procedures. However, 
the collective action can result in a declaratory decision regarding the 
unlawfulness of the defendants’ behaviour, which can be used in the 
individual procedures. Furthermore, the individual plaintiffs can authorize 
the organisation to collect the compensatory damages. This resembles a 
collective damages action, although it still has to be carried out in the name 
13 The proposal has met with strong opposition from business pressure groups. See 
K. Viitanen, above n. 12. 
14 Art. 47(B) of the Competition Act 1998. See Office of Fair Trading, Private
Actions in Competition Law: Effective Redress for Consumers and Business (2007). 
< http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/reports/comp_policy/oft916.pdf> 
15 K. Viitanen, above n. 12. 
16 P.H. Lindblom and K. Norback The Swedish Group Proceedings Act (2006) 191 
at 197. 
<http://www.bmelv.de/nn_754188/SharedDocs/downloads/02erbraucherschutz/ 
Markt /Verbraucherrechtstage/26-Nordback,templateId=raw,property=publication 
File.pdf/26-Nordback.pdf>. 
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of all individual plaintiffs. If not all plaintiffs are traceable or if more 
plaintiffs are likely to turn up in the future, these solutions are inadequate.  
In July 2005 the latter problem lead to a reform of the Dutch Civil 
Code. A defendant who has entered into a contract regarding the 
compensation of damages with a foundation or association possessing full 
legal capacity can request (jointly with the foundation or association) that the 
contract be declared binding by the court upon persons to whom the damage 
has been caused.17 The contract has to include a description of the group(s) 
of persons in whose favour the contract has been entered into, the number of 
persons belonging to this group, the compensation awarded to these persons 
(based on the group they belong to, i.e. damage scheduling) and the 
conditions with which these persons must comply to be eligible for 
compensation. Before it can declare the contract binding, the court has to 
assess the reasonableness of the amounts, the way in which the 
compensation can be received, whether the foundation or association is truly 
representative of consumers’ interests and the financial security posed. If the 
contract is declared binding, victims will receive the agreed amount and they 
will be bound to the contract as if they had entered into it themselves. 
Victims who do not want to be bound by the contract (to try to collect 
complete damages in an individual procedure, for example) can opt out 
within a period of at least three months after a public announcement of the 
intended declaration.
3 Benefits of collective actions 
Law and Economics literature provides arguments why private enforcement 
is sub-optimal to achieve the deterrence goal. Collective actions for damages 
are a potential remedy to the deficiencies of private enforcement by 
individual parties. These insights will be further explained in this section of 
the paper. Firstly, the main economic reasons why private enforcement is 
sub-optimal will be highlighted. In the literature, these arguments often lead 
17 According to the Dutch legislator, in many US cases of mass damages the parties 
involved first reach a settlement and subsequently enter into a damages class action 
to ask the court to declare the settlement binding. The legislator therefore opted for 
the system of making a settlement contract binding, instead of introducing class 
actions for damages. In legal literature, it is argued that it is exactly the threat of the 
class action that might induce tortfeasors to settle in the first place. It therefore 
remains to be seen if the Dutch system is able to provide a well-functioning solution 
for mass damages cases, now that it relies on the cooperation of the defendant. In the 
Dutch DES-case, the settlement indeed was declared binding, see Gerechtshof 
Amsterdam, June 1 2006, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 2006,461. 
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to the conclusion that public enforcement is necessary. However, before 
drawing this conclusion, one should investigate whether the problem of 
under-enforcement can be cured by improving the deterrent effect of private 
actions. Secondly, the economic benefits of collective actions will be 
explained. A good understanding of these benefits is necessary to see why, 
how and to what extent collective actions may cure the shortcomings of 
private enforcement by individual parties. It will be made clear throughout 
the analysis below that the achievement of better deterrence depends on the 
type of collective action (either initiated by individual parties or a 
representative body) and the specific design and modalities of collective 
actions (for example, the choice between an opt-out or opt-in scheme).  
3.1 The shortcomings of private enforcement by individual parties  
To enable a better understanding of the shortcomings of private enforcement 
of consumer law, a brief comparison with the ongoing discussion on the 
desirability of increased private enforcement of competition law is useful. 
This debate has revealed three main reasons why private enforcement may 
be sub-optimal: lack of information, rational apathy and free-riding. Firstly, 
one cannot rely only on private parties for discovering and proving 
infringements of competition law. Even though information advantages 
generally support private enforcement (for example, in the case of liability 
suffered by a single individual based on tort law)18, such benefits may not 
exist in the field of competition law. In cases of hard-core cartels (such as 
price-fixing), most consumers do not even realize that they have been 
harmed. Secondly, in cases of infringement of competition law, interests of 
individual consumers diverge from the general interest. Private parties will 
initiate proceedings only if the private benefits of doing so are higher than 
the private costs. In the field of competition law, this private cost-benefit 
calculus has no systematic relation with the social costs and benefits. The 
social costs also comprise the harm suffered by consumers who do not sue19
18 S. Shavell ‘The Optimal Structure of Law Enforcement’, 36 The Journal of Law 
and Economics 255 (1993) at 267. 
19 It is well-known from price theory that monopoly creates two problems: (1) 
consumers have to pay more for the product, since the monopolist may charge a 
super-competitive price (price effect), and (2) consumers may purchase less of the 
product, even though additional purchases would be utility maximizing for them 
(allocation effect). The price effect of monopoly is a mere distribution from the 
producer to the consumer. However, the allocation effect causes a ‘deadweight loss’, 
which is not captured by the monopolist. Cartels and firms enjoying a dominant 
position cause deadweight losses, similar to the allocative efficiency of monopoly. 
To achieve optimal deterrence, these losses should be compensated to force the 
firms involved to internalize the negative welfare effects of their behaviour. 
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and other losses (rent-seeking)20 that cannot be attributed to individual 
consumers. Even though it may be beneficial to society, individual 
consumers will not initiate enforcement actions, since potential plaintiffs are 
driven only by private gain, which could be lower than the expenses of their 
claims. From their point of view, not bringing any claim is perfectly rational; 
this problem is generally known as ‘rational apathy’. Finally, a system of 
private enforcement creates a free-riding problem. Every consumer who is a 
victim of an antitrust infringement has an interest to leave the enforcement 
efforts to other consumers, so that profits can be obtained without having to 
spend own resources. The free-riding problem will reduce the number of 
private actions below the level of enforcement that would be socially 
optimal. 
In the field of consumer law, one cannot rely only on private actions 
to achieve an optimal level of enforcement either. The reasons are similar to 
those which apply in the field of competition law. Firstly, individual 
consumers may lack information on infringements of consumer protection 
laws. It can be difficult for individual consumers to recognize poor quality in 
markets characterized by serious information asymmetries. Examples 
include unsound investment advice by a financial consultant and non-
transparent price calculations. It is also very difficult for consumers to assess 
whether manufacturers have obeyed safety regulations. Due to this 
information asymmetry, consumers may not start a lawsuit, even if the 
product they bought was defective. Consumers will often remain unaware of 
infringements before harm has occurred. For example, it could be very costly 
to check whether statements in advertisements are true or false. Also 
standard form contracts are usually signed without a prior reading of the 
contract terms, since the opportunity costs of time exceed the expected 
benefits from discovering harsh clauses.21
Secondly, there is a discrepancy between the private cost-benefit 
calculus of enforcement and the net social benefits. The social loss consists 
of the overall quality deterioration in markets plagued by information 
asymmetries. This social loss exceeds the private loss. If consumers have 
inadequate information to be able to distinguish beforehand between high-
quality and low-quality products, while sellers do, then a case can be made 
for public enforcement. After all, consumers are only willing to pay a price 
based on the average quality, because they cannot assess the quality of any 
20 These are the costs incurred to obtain and preserve a monopoly position. These 
costs are a pure welfare loss that must be added to the deadweight loss of monopoly. 
21 G. De Geest, ‘The Signing-Without-Reading Problem: An Analysis of the 
European Directive on Unfair Contract Terms’, in H.-B. Schäfer and H.-J. Lwowski 
(eds.), Konsequenzen wirtschaftsrechtlicher Normen (Wiesbaden: Deutsche 
Universitäts-Verlag 2002) 214. 
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particular product. High-quality products will be withdrawn from the market 
because the seller is not willing to accept only an average price. This 
withdrawal reduces the average quality remaining on the market, and 
consumers lower the price they are willing to pay accordingly. This process 
of ‘adverse selection’ continues until only products of the lowest quality are 
offered for sale.22 This problem appears in markets for second-hand products 
and in markets for consumer goods that are not bought regularly (restaurant 
services in tourist destinations, audio equipment) or the quality of which is 
difficult to assess (standard terms & conditions in contracts, professional 
services). To some extent, the market itself may cure these problems through 
the desire to build and maintain a good reputation. Trademarks and (honest) 
advertising may signal quality.23 However, consumer protection laws will be 
necessary to guarantee the quality of both experience goods, which are not 
regularly bought, and credence goods, the quality of which cannot be 
assessed by buyers. The social benefits of enforcement consist of increased 
overall quality of consumer goods. The private benefits are much smaller 
and only comprise the increase in quality of the products that the individual 
consumer buys. Therefore, consumers suffer from rational apathy and the 
private incentive to sue is insufficient from a social point of view.  
Incentives to file individual suits will be too low if the loss consists 
of trifle damage; the costs of the lawsuit may then even exceed the expected 
compensation.24 An example is product liability. Product-related losses can 
have a diffuse character: many individual consumers suffer a relatively small 
loss but the total social losses are substantial. This could lead to the situation 
that no individual plaintiff will file a suit because his private costs are higher 
than the expected private benefits.25 However, given the large overall losses, 
it is desirable that consumers sue because this will induce the manufacturer 
to avoid those losses.  
22 G.A. Akerlof ‘The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanism’, 84 Quarterly Journal of Economics 488 (1970). 
23 P. Nelson ‘Advertising as Information’, 82 Journal of Political Economy 729 
(1974). 
24 See W. H. van Boom, Efficacious Enforcement in Contract and Tort (Den Haag: 
Boom Juridische uitgevers 2006) at 17-18. 
25 The franchise in the European Directive on Products Liability intensifies the 
problem, because it bars claims on the basis of the Directive in case there is only 
property loss that does not exceed €500. Furthermore, the fact that much of the 
losses are covered by social and/or private insurance might strengthen the rational 
apathy with the consumers, even in cases where the individual loss might be 
substantial. This problem will be mitigated by the recourse claims that the insurance 
companies might start due to subrogation clauses in the insurance contracts. 
However, given that recourse claims are expensive, insurance companies might 
refrain from them in cases of relatively low losses, so that the problem will not be 
fully solved. 
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Finally, the free-rider problem hinders adequate enforcement of consumer 
protection rules. Every individual victim prefers other victims to sue the 
injurer, so that these others will incur costs and run the risk of losing the 
trial. If the plaintiff(s) win(s), victims who were not involved in the trial 
might benefit from the outcome of the trial all the same. This is clearest in 
cases where the plaintiff(s) has sued for an injunction or some kind of reform 
(e.g. improved product safety requirements). However, the free-rider 
problem is also present in cases where the plaintiff(s) have sued for 
damages. If legal and/or factual questions have been answered in the trial, 
the costs for other victims to start a case of their own will be lower. If all (or 
too many) victims behave as a free rider, there will be no lawsuit to start 
with and consumer protection rules will not be enforced.  
3.2 Collective action as a remedy for the shortcomings of private 
enforcement 
Public enforcement may be advanced as a remedy to the problems discussed 
above. Public enforcement agencies may be better at discovering 
infringements, since they have investigative powers at their disposal. 
Moreover, they should have better incentives to bring claims since they have 
to protect the broader public interest rather than the dispersed small interests 
of individual consumers. However, some authors have argued that before 
resorting to public enforcement, possibilities to improve the efficacy of 
private enforcement should first be examined.26 In the latter view, 
adaptations of the institutional legal framework for private enforcement 
might overcome the inefficiencies described above.  
The case for a ‘creative adaptation’ of private enforcement 
procedures can also be made from an efficiency perspective, focusing on 
deterrence. If collective actions lead to a higher ‘willingness to sue’,27 the 
26 W.H. van Boom, above n. 24. 
27 This is ultimately an empirical question. Results of Euro-barometer surveys 
provide some anecdotal evidence that consumers may be more willing to sue if 
collective actions are possible. According to the survey conducted in 2004, 
respectively 2006, 67 respectively 77 per cent of European Union citizens will be 
more willing to defend their rights before a court if they can join with other 
consumers who complain about the same issue. The European consumer 
organisation BEUC therefore asserts that collective actions are particularly suitable 
to obtain compensation for damages where a large number of consumers are 
involved, and that, if handled individually, such claims will never be brought to 
court by the victims.’ See C. Hodges ‘Competition Enforcement, Regulation and 
Civil Justice: What is the Case?’, 43 Common Market Law Review 1381 (2006) at 
1387. 
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wrongdoer will be confronted with a sanction that better reflects the real 
losses inflicted on consumers in general. This is particularly important when 
the sanction imposed in public enforcement proceedings (a mere injunction 
or a fine which does not equal the harm caused) is lower than the total social 
costs. Well-designed collective actions may lead to better internalisation of 
the negative externalities flowing from infringements of consumer protection 
laws, and thus contribute to achieving the deterrence goal. Also the fact that 
more victims may be willing to bring suit, if they can share risks and 
expenses, will provide a better picture of the total losses that are actually 
caused by the wrongdoer. This size of the losses will be the starting point for 
determining damages so that future violations are deterred by forcing the law 
infringer to internalise the externalities caused.  
The question thus arises whether collective actions may overcome 
(most of) the aforementioned problems. Firstly, it should be investigated to 
what extent a collective action can cure the information deficiencies with 
respect to law infringements. Secondly, it must be examined whether and, if 
so, how collective actions can solve the rational apathy problem. Finally, the 
type of collective action which best overcomes the free-riding problem 
should be chosen.  
3.2.1 Collective actions as a remedy for information deficiencies 
There are several ways in which collective actions can solve, or at least 
diminish, information deficiencies. In this respect, we must distinguish 
between collective actions sensu stricto and representative actions. Under 
opt-in collective actions, consumers must be appropriately notified about the 
occurrence of any infringement that has caused them harm. Economically 
speaking, the value of the information provided is higher than the costs of 
the notification if it incites consumers to initiate a group action to recover 
damages. Benefits resulting from the reduction of information asymmetries 
may be particularly large in the case of representative actions. Generally 
speaking, consumer associations have a better knowledge of the applicable 
laws than individual consumers, so they are better able to assess whether 
certain behaviour of firms constitutes an infringement. The organisations can 
employ lawyers who are specialized in the relevant fields of law. This could 
even make the consumer organisation the better-informed party regarding 
the applicable rules. Obviously, there still will be an information asymmetry 
regarding possible infringements in so far as they are not easily detectable. 
Detection requires monitoring and supervision, which is costly. For 
individual consumers these costs are almost by definition insurmountable, 
but consumer organisations might acquire adequate funding for such 
investigations by charging their members a membership fee or by means of 
sponsoring. 
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Thanks to collective actions, economies of scale can be achieved. It is more 
expensive for individual consumers to investigate possible infringements in 
their own separate cases than for a group of consumers who jointly initiate a 
collective action. Consequently, it is not the inferior information of 
individual consumers that determines whether there is a real threat of 
liability, but the better information of the group of harmed consumers. The 
achievable economies of scale are larger under opt-out collective actions 
than under an opt-in scheme, since the number of harmed consumers reached 
will be larger. Economies of scale are even more important if the 
investigation is done by a consumer organisation which can monitor market 
participants more regularly. Furthermore, consumer organisations are repeat 
players, whereas individual consumers are one-shotters.28 Representative 
actions by consumer organisations may restore the balance that is lost in 
interactions between one-shotters and repeat players.  
3.2.2 Collective actions as a remedy to the rational apathy problem  
Collective actions may be able to solve a number of causes of the rational 
apathy problem. Firstly, from the point of view of an individual claimant the 
cost-benefit ratio of collective actions is clearly superior to the net benefits 
of an individual claim. If collective actions allow compensation of the losses 
of an entire group of harmed consumers, the cost-benefit ratio improves 
further. Secondly, collective actions spread the risk of uncertainty over a 
large number of affected individuals, and this will increase the number of 
claims brought in courts. Finally, the free-riding problem can be solved if 
those who benefit from a successful collective action are forced to contribute 
to its costs. These benefits will be elaborated on below. 
a Reduced costs and increased benefits29
An individual will only start legal proceedings if the expected utility of the 
lawsuit exceeds its costs. These costs are lower in the case of collective 
actions than in the case of separate individual actions, because they are 
spread over a large group of injured people. The expected utility will be 
higher in the case of the violation of subjective rights than in the event of 
28 M. Galanter ‘Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of 
Legal Change’, 9 Law & Society Review 95 (1974).
29 See A. van Aaken ‘Massenklagen im öffentlichen Recht aus 
institutionenökonomischer Sicht: Eine Art der direkten Volksrechte’, 86 Kritische 
Vierteljahresschrift für Gesetzgebung und Rechtswissenschaft 44 (2003) at 55 et 
seq.
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infringement of diffuse interests. In the latter case the court decision is a 
public good, since it creates non-rivalrous and non-excludable benefits.  
The possibility of a collective action increases the number of 
lawsuits, because the expected net benefit will be higher than in the case of 
an individual claim. After all, the costs of the lawsuit decrease while the 
probability of winning the suit (and thereby the expected utility as well) 
increases if multiple plaintiffs have larger financial means, enabling them to 
have better access to evidence and get better legal advice. The problem of 
rational apathy is therefore reduced. Furthermore, an individual party is 
more likely to initiate proceedings in the case of a violation of a subjective 
right than in the case of diffuse harmed interests, since the net benefit of a 
successful claim is higher in the former scenario. In diffuse interest cases, 
where the expected utility is too low to start an individual claim, the 
possibility of collective actions could make a claim feasible. After all, the 
costs per person are lower with a collective action, so that the net expected 
benefits (the expected benefits minus the costs) might turn out positive. In 
some cases, however, the diffuse interests are so immaterial to the injured 
parties involved that even the possibility of collective actions does not lead 
to a lawsuit.30
Besides the high litigation costs, the rational apathy may also be due 
to the fact that the size of the expected damages is low. Collective actions 
not only decrease litigation costs in the way described above but also 
increase the prospective damages awards. Every collective action that is 
initiated in cases where no individual suits would have been brought 
increases the total sanction faced by a potential law infringer. The latter 
effect appears to be stronger under an opt-out collective action than under an 
opt-in scheme, since the group of compensated consumers tends to be larger. 
Moreover, empirical evidence indicates that actual opt-out rates are 
extremely low.31 Therefore, the size of the sanction expected under opt-out 
will be larger than under opt-in (and the largest under a mandatory regime).  
30 In the United States these losses are called ‘nonviable claims’. The expenses an 
individual would incur in asserting a right to a share of a class judgment would be 
greater than his expected share of the recovery. In a Dutch publication regarding 
such losses they are termed ‘scattered losses’ (strooischade). Examples include 
charging too high interest rates or other surcharges by credit card companies, 
incorrect rounding off of gasoline prices by gasoline station proprietors in the same 
distribution chain and incorrect rounding off of prices by shopkeepers as a result of 
the intended abolishment of eurocents. See I.N. Tzankova, Strooischade (Deventer: 
Kluwer 2005) at 20, 21. 
31 With respect to the US, the average opt-out rate is not higher than 0.6 percent. See 
T. Eisenberg and G.P. Miller, ‘The Role of Opt-Outs and Objectors in Class Action 
Litigation: Theoretical and Empirical Issues’ (March 23, 2004) NYU, Law and 
Economics Research Paper No. 04-004; Cornell Law School Research Paper No. 
04-019. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=528146. 
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b Risk spreading 
Under collective actions, plaintiffs no longer run the risk of having to bear 
extensive (litigation) costs if they lose the case. If they bundle their claims, 
so that only one lawsuit is initiated instead of many separate ones, they share 
the costs. Even if the costs of this collective claim are higher than the costs 
of a single individual claim, they will certainly be lower than the costs of all 
separate claims added together. Each individual plaintiff now only has a 
lower amount at stake. The financial effect of losing the case is spread over 
all individuals participating in the collective action, so that each individual 
only bears a small amount if the case is lost. People are better able to bear a 
small loss than a larger loss, so that the barriers to start a lawsuit are 
lowered. This will lead to more claims being filed. 
In cases where a consumer association files a claim on behalf of its 
members, the costs of the lawsuit are spread over all members. They pay for 
these costs through their membership fee. If the case is lost and the 
association has to pay legal expenses, the members do not pay for these 
losses directly. Obviously, the more often the association files claims and 
loses, the higher the membership fee has to be in order to cover these costs. 
The membership fee in this respect resembles an insurance premium: by 
collecting enough fees (insurance premiums), the association (insurance 
company) acquires adequate funds to be able to file the claim (cover the 
insured event). Each individual member (insured) is certain to ‘lose’ the fee 
(premium) but no longer runs the risk of having to pay the full legal 
expenses of an individual claim (the insured event). 
Finally, American-style class actions in which damages are claimed 
are also able to spread or shift risks, mainly because they are almost always 
accompanied by a system of contingency fees.32 In essence, the attorney 
takes the risk of losing the case, because he only receives a fee if the case is 
won (no cure, no pay). The fee often consists of a percentage of the awarded 
damages (quota pars litis). If the case is lost, the plaintiffs do not pay 
anything and hence run no risk. If the case is won, the attorney’s fee is 
deducted from the compensation received and the remaining damages are 
paid in one form or another to the plaintiffs. In this situation, they do not run 
a risk either. Of course, the attorney will charge a risk premium for this 
construction. This explains why the attorneys receive a relative large fraction 
32  It would be impossible to collect small contributions for costs of council from all 
plaintiffs in advance, so a system of contingency fees is necessary to enable the use 
of class actions. See H-B. Schäfer, ‘The Bundling of Similar Interests in Litigation. 
The Incentives for Class Actions and Legal Actions taken by Associations’, 9 
European Journal of Law and Economics 183 (2000) at 192. 
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of the damages as legal fee (often about 30%). The plaintiffs pay ex post for 
the legal services by receiving a lower amount of damages. This is the price 
they have to pay for shifting the risk. Given that each individual plaintiff  
receives a lower amount, this can still be regarded as a form of risk sharing. 
3.2.3 Solving the free-riding problem 
In collective actions initiated by individual consumers, a possible solution to 
the free-rider problem is to rule out the possibility of individual actions once 
a collective action has been initiated. Individuals will then no longer be able 
to first await the result of the collective action before deciding whether they 
want to initiate a private lawsuit.33 The opt-out possibility that exists in many 
class actions and other forms of collective actions, as well as in the Dutch 
system of declaring the settlement contract binding, should then be 
abolished. The free-rider problem may also be tackled by increasing the 
costs of individual claims after a collective action has been undertaken. If the 
costs increase for plaintiffs who do not have a compelling argument for not 
joining the collective claim, the result of weighing costs and benefits will 
change. This might lead to more individuals choosing for the collective 
action. In essence, the free-ride (which Stigler correctly argues  is actually a 
‘cheap ride’ because the profiteer incurs the costs of the lower expected gain 
of the collective action)34 becomes more expensive and hence less attractive. 
In cases where the individual losses are high enough to make 
individual claims feasible, the free-rider problem seems limited because 
individual victims will start a lawsuit to collect damages anyway, 
irrespective of what others do. Given that the costs of litigation decrease per 
plaintiff if they bundle their claims, there will still be an incentive to 
collectivise, notwithstanding the free-rider problem.35 In many cases of 
widespread losses, the individual losses of each victim are too small to make 
opting out an attractive strategy. By staying in the group or class, the victim 
contributes to the costs of the lawsuit, but also has a higher chance of 
receiving compensation. By opting out, the victim does not bear any costs, 
but given that his losses are only small, an individual suit is not worthwhile. 
Therefore, the possibility of free riding does not appear to be a major 
problem in cases with widespread losses where the victims claim 
33  See e.g. D. Rosenberg and J.P. Sullivan ‘Coordinating Private Class Action and 
Public Agency Enforcement of Antitrust Law’, 2 Journal of Competition Law and 
Economics 159 (2006) at 177. 
34 G.J. Stigler, ‘Free Riders and Collective Action: An Appendix to Theories of 
Economic Regulation’, 5 The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 
359 (1974) at 360. 
35  H-B. Schäfer, above n. 32, at 186. 
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compensation.36 Furthermore, given that many collective actions will be 
settled, it remains to be seen if the collective action provides free-riders with 
information that they could use in their own individual claim.37 However, if 
the plaintiffs sue for an injunction or reform, the free-riding problem should 
be taken seriously. It could very well frustrate the possibilities of private 
enforcement, making public enforcement a better option.  
Collective actions initiated by consumer associations could mitigate 
the free-rider problem, in as far as the association is able to charge its 
members a fee for the costs incurred. This way, the members are forced to 
contribute to the funds necessary to file the collective suit and they cannot 
behave as free riders. However, non-members can still behave as free riders 
because they do not contribute to, but still benefit from the efforts of the 
association. Why would an individual join the association if it limits their 
possibilities to take a free ride? The prevailing explanation is that the 
consumer association offers other benefits to its members, such as a 
newsletter, subsidized legal assistance and discount possibilities. Stigler has 
challenged this explanation: Why would consumers be willing to pay a price 
for these private goods and services if this price is so high that it can also be 
used to cover the expenses of production of the public good? A rival 
association offering the same private goods and services but without the 
collective actions would be able to charge lower prices and consumers would 
prefer to join this second association.38 However, to the extent that 
competing associations are absent, the above line of reasoning still holds and 
the associations are able to reduce the free-rider problem. 
4 Disadvantages of collective actions 
The story cannot end here. Even though collective actions may generate 
benefits in terms of economies of scale, risk-sharing, curing rational apathy 
of individual consumers and overcoming the free-riding problem, these 
advantages also come at a cost. Class actions in the United States have had a 
36 This is also argued by G.P. Miller, ‘Class Actions’, in: P. Newman (ed.), The New 
Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law, volume 1 (Houndmills: Palgrave 
Macmillan 1998) 257 at 260. 
37 H-B. Schäfer, above n. 32, at 192. 
38 G.J. Stigler, above n. 34 at 360. This argument is nicely illustrated by the Dutch 
case of the ANWB versus Route Mobiel. The ANWB is a Dutch organisation that 
provides signposts, an alarm service for stranded tourists, a repair and towing 
service for motorists whose vehicle has broken down, et cetera. Route Mobiel is an 
organisation that entered the market for repair and towing services in 2005. In its 
advertisements, Route Mobiel explicitly states that it provides the services cheaper 
than the ANWB, because it does not offer “the whole circus of thousands of office 
staff, emergency telephones and a magazine that you do not read anyway.” 
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bad press, both from consumer lawyers and legal economists. There are two 
main causes for resulting inefficiencies: i) the principal-agent problem, 
which results from information asymmetries on the side of clients and 
inhibits their control of the quality of the attorney’s performance; and ii) the 
risk of opportunistic behaviour, which leads to frivolous suits. These 
problems have often led European policy-makers to argue against the 
introduction of collective actions. However, an intelligent design of 
collective actions coping with the problems of the American-style class 
action and a greater reliance on representative actions might achieve the 
advantages described in the previous section of this paper without causing 
costs that outweigh their benefits.  
4.1 Principal-agent problems  
It is well-known from the literature on the regulation of the legal profession 
that clients (principals) face great difficulties in controlling the quality of the 
performance of the lawyers (agents). Information asymmetries exist which 
make it difficult or even impossible for the client to assess the quality of the 
lawyer’s work. In individual cases, the client has an immediate interest, so 
he may try to monitor his lawyer’s efforts to a certain extent. In collective 
actions, however, the plaintiffs’ interests are often too small to undertake any 
monitoring activities. In American class actions, the attorney thus becomes 
the leading actor of the case and might pursue his private interests to the 
detriment of the harmed consumer group as a whole. The principal-agent 
problems could be exacerbated by the way in which the collective action is 
funded. Even though contingency fees may pay the costs of the suit (and 
thus improve access to justice), they create new problems. Firstly, under 
contingency fees the attorneys’ efforts may not be optimal. Secondly, 
contingency fees could lead to early settlements that are disadvantageous for 
the clients. Both objections are explained below. 
From the plaintiffs’ point of view, the optimal effort of the attorney 
is determined by comparing marginal costs with marginal benefits. As long 
as the costs of additional efforts are lower than the increase in the expected 
benefits (the probability of winning the case, multiplied by the damages that 
will then be received), it is desirable that the lawyer invests additional 
efforts. However, the optimal effort for the lawyer himself is determined by 
comparing the costs of additional efforts with the increase in the expected 
fee, which is only a percentage of the expected benefits of the plaintiffs. 
Hence, the expected benefits for the lawyer of putting in additional efforts 
are smaller than the expected benefits for the plaintiff. This will lead him to 
spend less effort than the client would want him to do. This risk may be 
mitigated by the desire to build and maintain a good reputation. However, in 
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class actions the reputation mechanism cannot work in an optimal way. It is 
the lawyer who seeks the clients, not the other way around.39
An often heard objection to contingency fees is that they could lead 
to early settlements which are not in the interest of plaintiffs. Again the 
principal-agent problem lies at the basis of this inefficient outcome. It is 
attractive for the attorney, who receives a percentage of the damages awards 
as his fee, to settle the case if his private costs of pursuing the claim 
outweigh the expected increase in the fee to be received. For the class 
members it could be better if the attorney continues the litigation, because 
their expected damages under continued legal proceedings may be higher 
than the settled amount. For example,40 if there is an 80% chance of winning 
the case and the damages amount to $10 million, the expected damages for 
the plaintiffs are $8 million. If the lawyer’s fee amounts to 25% of the 
damages awarded, his expected fee will equal $2 million. If the defendant 
offers to settle for $6 million, the attorney will receive $1.5 million, without 
having to continue the litigation and running the 20% risk of losing. It is 
attractive for the lawyer to accept this offer if his private costs of conducting 
litigation and bearing the risk of losing the trial exceed $500.000 (the 
difference between the expected fee when litigating and the certain fee when 
settling). For the plaintiffs however, the expected result of litigation is 75% 
of $8 million, hence $6 million. In the case of settlement they will only 
receive $4.5 million. It remains to be seen whether they would have been 
willing to accept this lower amount themselves in order to receive 
compensation sooner and to be rid of the uncertainty of the outcome of the 
case. It is even possible that the defendant proposes a settlement deal which 
is inferior for the injured parties when compared to the expected outcome of 
the trial, but superior for the plaintiffs’ lawyer. Suppose the plaintiffs’ 
attorney expects an outcome at trial of $10 million (and the defendant has 
the same assessment), out of which he would receive 25% as fee. If the 
defendant offers to settle at $8 million, out of which $3 million goes to the 
plaintiffs’ lawyer, the lawyer will gain $500,000 by settling, while the 
plaintiffs will lose $2.5 million. 
4.2 The risk of unmeritorious suits 
The American experience shows that class actions may be initiated to inflict 
reputational harm on companies. Class actions are likely to cause higher 
reputational losses than individual cases, so that class actions increase the 
risk of opportunistic behaviour. Firms may prefer an early settlement if this 
costs them less than the sum of the losses of handling the case in court. The 
39 H-B. Schäfer, above n. 32, at 193. 
40  See G.P. Miller, above n. 36, at 258, 259. 
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size of these losses creates scope for abuses if the class attorney can easily 
obtain payment of damages (parts of which are paid to him under the 
contingency fee arrangement). Frivolous suits may be brought if the amount 
of this payment for the company is lower than the costs of defending itself in 
court. This can even happen if the class attorney is certain that he will lose 
the case, because the costs for the defendant of going to court (legal fees and 
reputational harm, for example) might outweigh the settlement amount. 
In addition, class actions increase the expected payment (and 
therefore under contingency fees the lawyer’s payment as well) by far more 
than the increase in the lawyer’s costs. Assuming that the lawyer will only 
take on a case if his expected payment is higher than his expected costs, he 
will be willing to take on a class action at a much lower probability of 
success than he would take on an individual case. It remains to be seen if 
such cases are desirable on a social level, given the low probability of 
success in the first place.41
The question arises whether the problems discussed above can be 
mitigated by imposing restrictive conditions on collective actions. 
Defendants who win the case could be given the right to claim their lawyers’ 
expenses from their unsuccessful opponents. This will lower the 
attractiveness of unmeritorious claims, although the possibility of 
reputational harm might still induce defendants to settle. Other solutions 
require more drastic changes and a different institutional design of collective 
actions. These alternatives are discussed in the next section.  
4.3 How to avoid principal-agent problems and frivolous suits 
Different solutions have been suggested to mitigate principal-agent problems 
and to overcome the risk of frivolous suits in collective actions. More 
restrictive conditions could be imposed on collective actions. There also may 
be a preference for a greater reliance on representative actions brought by 
consumer associations, provided that the accountability problem can be 
solved. 
4.3.1 Restrictive conditions on collective actions 
To mitigate the principal-agent problems, it has been suggested a public 
auction be held for selecting the attorney in charge of representing victims 
and compensating the claimants and the lawyer through the proceeds of the 
auction.42 The defendant’s attorney himself can also bid in the auction. If he 
41 H-B. Schäfer, above n. 32, at 189.  
42 J.R. Macey and G.P. Miller ‘The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class Action and 
Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform’, 58 
University of Chicago Law Review 1 (1991); J.R. Macey and G.P. Miller 
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wins, in essence a settlement is reached. The underlying idea is that the 
auction will reveal the lawyer best qualified to litigate the case in the most 
efficient way. Agency problems are solved because ownership and control 
are united in a single party. However, if the auction is not properly run, this 
can lead to adverse selection problems so that cheaper but poor-quality 
lawyers will win the tender.43 It would then follow that the quality of legal 
services decreases to the detriment of consumers.  
Contingency fees may be prohibited and replaced by a fixed fee set 
by a governmental authority. Hay proposes to limit the fee in case of a 
settlement to the percentage the attorney would have received in a trial, 
thereby ensuring the class members a recovery not lower than the outcome 
of a continued litigation. He stresses that the problem with contingency fees 
is not primarily that the fee will be excessive if seen as a fraction of the 
settlement amount (20% or so), but that it is too large if compared to what 
the lawyer would have received if the case was tried (say, only 10%). This 
will induce the lawyer to settle for too small amounts. The greater the 
difference between the two percentages, the larger the problem will be. 
However, due to informational problems it remains doubtful if the fee can be 
set at such a level that the efforts of the lawyer who handles the case will be 
optimal.44
Another way to combat inadequate settlement is to introduce a 
preliminary test of the merits of the case45 or to enable a judicial review of 
settlements that class members would not have agreed upon. Koniak and 
Cohen propose a mandatory summary judgment as a superior solution to a 
pre-certification merits review.46 The latter solution has been adopted in the 
US Securities Litigation Reform Act. However, the scepticism of 
commentators has seemingly been confirmed, since the results of the reform 
‘Auctioning Class Action and Derivative Suits: A Rejoinder’, 87 Northwestern 
University Law Review 458 (1992). 
43 If information deficiencies make it difficult to assess the optimal amount of 
damages, the tender may be won by the lawyer who offers his services at the lowest 
price. Contingency fees mitigate this problem (since the lawyer’s fee is linked to the 
achieved result) but create problems of their own (see above). 
44 B.L. Hay ‘Asymmetric Rewards: Why Class Actions (May) Settle for Too Little’, 
48 Hastings Law Journal 479 (1997) . 
45 R.G. Bone and D.S. Evans ‘Class Certification and the Substantive Merits’, 51 
Duke Law Journal 1251 (2002); G.P. Miller, ‘Review of the Merits in Class Action 
Certification’, (May 4, 2004). Bepress Legal Series, Working Paper 262.
http://law.bepress.com/expresso/eps/262. 
46 S.P. Koniak and G.M. Cohen ‘Under Cloak of Settlement’, 82 Virginia Law 
Review 1051 (1996). 
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were ambiguous, as unmeritorious and meritorious claims alike may have 
been discouraged.47
Principal-agent problems in collective actions will persist if there is 
no adequate monitoring. In individual cases where the plaintiff has an 
immediate interest in the case, he will spend some resources in monitoring 
the lawyer, which limits the agency problems. In class actions, not even the 
named plaintiff will have an incentive to monitor the lawyer, given that his 
interest in winning the case is low. This will be truer still for the other 
members of the class and especially for the victims, who do not even know 
that they will be a member of the class at a later stage.48 As a solution, courts 
could review the outcome of the collective action. However, courts may lack 
the information to be able to properly monitor the lawyer.49
4.3.2 Greater reliance on representative actions  
In the case of a collective action initiated by consumer associations, the risk 
of unwarranted side effects may be less serious. Even though this risk does 
not completely disappear, it could be better contained. On the one hand, 
consumer associations (agents) may be presumed to act in the collective 
interests of the consumers (principals). On the other hand, consumer 
associations might pursue goals of their own which conflict with objectives 
of consumer welfare. In particular, the risk of abuse cannot be excluded if 
the consumer associations are allowed to claim damages. The seriousness of 
this risk depends among others on the extent to which the members can 
control the association, the possibilities of the association to control the 
lawyer acting on its behalf, and the possible influence of third parties on the 
association.50 If the first two relations are strong and the third weak, 
consumer associations will be well-suited to bring collective action, because 
they will serve as perfect agents for their principals. However, in most cases 
of widespread losses the members have little control over the association, 
which might be influenced by political groups or groups with a moral 
concern. The interests of the latter groups may not align with the interests of 
the members, so principal-agent problems might persist.51
47  See several studies reviewed by J.C. Choi, ‘The Evidence on Securities Class 
Actions’, (April 7, 2004) UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No. 528145,
available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=528145. 
48  See C. Silver, ‘Class Actions – Representative Proceedings’, in: B. Bouckaert and 
G. De Geest (eds.), Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, Volume V. The Economics 
of Crime and Litigation (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 2000) 194 at 215 ff. 
49 For an example, see C. Silver, above n. 48, at 215. Also see G.P. Miller, above n. 
36, at 259. 
50 H.-B. Schäfer, above n. 32, at 198.  
51 Id. at 199. 
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To guarantee that consumer associations are truly representative, a number 
of requirements regarding their credibility, reputability and commitment to 
acting in the collective interests of consumers must be fixed and enforced. 
This may be achieved by conferring standing to bring a representative action 
only to consumer associations approved by a governmental body or granted 
permission by the courts for a particular case or cases. Governmental 
approval may be decided upon on examination of the articles of 
incorporation, size of the membership and geographical scope of the 
activities of the consumer association. Furthermore, regulations may impose 
requirements regarding the possibilities of members to actually control the 
decisions of the association. 
It is interesting to note that UK research suggests that consumer 
associations rarely bring suit. The reason can be that associations do not see 
enforcement as their core business and that they are not willing to spend 
resources on lawsuits, which have an uncertain outcome.52 Hence, collective 
actions brought by public bodies may be warranted after all, even if private 
associations, too, can start collective actions. Clearly, if a collective action is 
initiated by a public agency, the borderline with public enforcement will 
become spurious.  
5 Conclusions 
Improving consumer rights may remain meaningless if these rights are not 
adequately enforced. The design of enforcement mechanisms should ensure 
the achievement of two major goals: deterrence and compensation. In this 
paper, the focus of the analysis has been put on the former goal. Starting 
from the insight that individual claims may be insufficient to deter 
infringements of consumer protection laws, it has been investigated whether 
collective actions may overcome this enforcement deficit. Law and 
Economics literature advances three major reasons why private enforcement 
by individual consumers is insufficient from a deterrence perspective. 
Firstly, consumers may not realize that rules are violated or find out 
infringements only after harm has occurred. Secondly, consumers might be 
rationally apathetic and may not bring claims if the social benefit-cost 
calculus differs from the expected private benefits and costs of a law suit. 
Finally, individual consumers may wish to free-ride on the efforts of other 
consumers who might initiate legal proceedings. Under these circumstances, 
the threat of individual claims will not sufficiently deter potential law 
infringers. Therefore, it is regularly argued that public enforcement is 
necessary to prevent violations of consumer law. 
52 C. Hodges above n. 27, at 1388. 
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This paper has investigated the question whether private collective actions 
can contribute to the prevention of consumer law infringements, so that one 
should not always resort to public enforcement. To answer this question, we 
must compare the benefits and costs of collective actions. On the positive 
side, collective actions generate information about the violation of consumer 
law, mitigate the rational apathy problem and may cure the free-rider 
problem. On the negative side, collective actions may exacerbate principal-
agent problems between lawyers and clients and create scope for frivolous 
suits.  
The size of both the benefits and costs depends on the type of 
collective action and its modalities. The distinction between collective 
actions initiated by individual consumers and representative bodies acting in 
the interests of consumers in general, as well as the division between opt-in 
and opt-out mechanisms are crucial to assess their contribution to deterrence. 
As far as the improvement of information flows is concerned, representative 
actions have a larger potential than collective actions initiated by individual 
consumers. For solving the rational apathy problem, opt-out collective 
actions are preferable to opt-in collective actions and representative actions 
again have the largest potential (particularly if they are organized as an opt-
out or mandatory action). The free-riding problem cannot be entirely solved 
in collective actions, since consumers may benefit from a decision 
constituting a prima facie case in a posterior individual claim (even though 
they must explicitly express their wish not to be bound under an opt-out 
scheme). Consumer associations may mitigate the free-riding problem 
through charging membership fees, but may not be able to fully eliminate the 
risk that benefits also flow to non-members. 
This paper has discussed two major disadvantages of collective 
actions: principal-agent problems between lawyers or representative bodies 
and individual consumers, and the risk of frivolous suits. Generally 
speaking, the ensuing costs seem to be larger with traditional collective 
actions than with representative actions. Experience gained with US class 
actions shows that attorneys may take decisions, such as early settlements, 
that are not in the interest of their clients and that attorneys may also initiate 
unmeritorious suits. These problems cannot be overcome easily. Due to 
informational asymmetries, it will be difficult to regulate the magnitude of 
the fees or to subject the outcome of the case to judicial review. In the case 
of representative actions, regulations may impose conditions to guarantee 
that consumer associations are really representative and act in the collective 
interests of consumers in general. The need for regulation shows that public 
intervention will remain necessary even if more scope is created for private 
collective damages actions.  
Several questions for future research remain. Since collective actions 
are not a perfect instrument to achieve optimal deterrence, the question 
arises what the ideal mix of public enforcement and private enforcement of 
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consumer protection law should look like. If the contribution of collective 
actions to deterrence remains modest, their potential to achieve corrective 
justice will become the focal point of the analysis. If the attention shifts from 
deterrence to compensation, a number of different questions will emerge. 
How large will the group of consumers be who have suffered harm 
as a consequence of infringements of consumer law and who will be 
compensated thanks to the availability of a collective action? How can it be 
assured that the damages awards are aligned with the magnitude of the actual 
harm suffered? How must the damages be collected and distributed? How 
can victimized consumers be identified? What would be the optimal use of 
damages awards that cannot be distributed to individual consumers? These 
and other questions could not be addressed within the confines of this paper. 
Obviously, they must be analysed thoroughly before any policy conclusions 
on the desirability of collective actions may be drawn.  
